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Preface 
This paper1 is part of the research project “Auditing, regulation and control”, financed 
by the Norwegian Research Council. It is written in connection to the research group 
“Adminsitration and governance” at the Rokkan Centre. The data basis is placed at our 
disposal by the research program “Power and Democracy” and it is based on a broad 
mass survey of the Norwegian citizens conducted in 2001. An earlier version of the 
paper was presented at the panel  “The Power to Create Trust: the Impact of Public 
Sector Reform on Citizens” at the American Society for Public Administration’s 64th 
National Conference, “The Power of Public Service”, Washington D.C., March 15.–18., 
2003. We want to thank the participants at this panel, Lise Hellebø and Paul G. Roness 
for helpful comments.  
                                                 
1 To be presented at the panel on “The Power to Create Trust: the Impact of Public Sector Reform on Citizens” at 
the ASPA’s 64th National Conference, “The Power of Public Service”, Washington D.C., March 15.–18., 2003. 
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Summary 
This paper examines trust in government along three dimensions: general levels of trust, 
trust in political bodies and actors and trust in the civil service. In correlating trust in 
government with citizens’ general attitudes towards democracy, their assessment of the 
organization and functioning of the public sector and their attitudes to public-sector 
reforms, a distinction is drawn between traditionalist and modernist attitudes. The 
theoretical framework of the paper is institutional theory, and the analysis is based on a 
mass survey conducted among 2,297 respondents in Norway in 2001. The main findings 
are first, that people’s trust in government is of a general character: a high level of trust 
in one institution tends to extend to other institutions. Second, general attitudes towards 
how democracy works in Norway have the strongest overall effect on variations in 
citizens’ trust in government. Third, trust is also significantly affected by whether a 
person holds modernist or traditional values. Traditionalists, especially people who want 
to strengthen the public sector, have more trust in government generally, and in the 
public administration specifically, than modernists, who believe there are significant 
efficiency problems within the public sector.  
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Samandrag 
I dette notatet fokuserer vi på tillit i folket til ulike politiske institusjonar og aktørar og til 
offentleg forvaltning. Eit sentralt spørsmål er i kva grad tillit til desse institusjonane 
varierer med generelle politisk- og ideologiske haldningar og med tradisjonelle og 
modernistiske oppfatningar om offentleg sektor. Paperet er forankra i institusjonell teori 
og analysen er basert på ei survey til eit representativt utvalg av det norske folket i 2001. 
Hovudfunna er for det første at folks tillit til offentlege styresmakter er av ein generell 
karakter. Dersom folk har høg tillit til ein institusjon eller gruppe så har dei også høg 
tillit til andre institusjonar. For det andre har generelle oppfatningar om korleis 
demokratiet fungerer i Norge den gjennomgåande største effekten på variasjonar i folks 
tilllit til offentlege styresmakter. For det tredje er tillitsnivået også påverka av om folk 
har tradisjonalistiske eller modernistiske haldningar til offentelg sektor. Tradisjonalistar, 
særleg dei som ønskjer å styrkja offentleg sektor, har større tillit til offentlege 
styresmakter generelt og til offentleg forvaltning spesielt enn folk som gjev uttrykk for 
modernistiske haldningar, for eksempel ved å hevda at det er store effektivitetsproblem i 
offentleg sektor.   
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Introduction  
Trust in government is a mainstay of democracy. Yet the relationship between 
democracy and trust is paradoxical. On the one hand, the legitimacy of political and 
administrative institutions and actors vital to the political process is based largely on 
trust. In a system of indirect democracy the people delegate their sovereignty to these 
institutions and actors, trusting that this mandate will be handled in an appropriate way. 
On the other hand, an inherent part of any democracy is a “healthy distrust” in, or at 
least scepticism towards, the interests of others, especially the powerful. Thus 
democratic systems also institutionalize distrust or scepticism by providing many 
opportunities for citizens to monitor the activities of people and institutions they 
supposedly trust (Warren 1999). This monitoring function is performed by independent 
bodies seen by Olsen (1988) as democratic safeguards in a state that has strong 
integrative features and scores high on what he labels “moral community” values.  
Trust is a complex and multi-dimensional concept, potentially subject to inconsistent 
and ambiguous interpretation, and the causal link between trust and good government is 
a contested one (Braithwaite and Levi 1998, Lægreid 1993, Rothstein and Stolle 2002). 
Trust can be both general, directed towards the political-administrative system as such, 
and much more specific. Trust may be inspired by core political and administrative 
institutions or else it may be more contingent on the behaviour of central political and 
administrative leaders (Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2001). Trust may vary according to 
developments and events in the (political) environment, via a kind of determinist 
mechanism, or else be based more strictly on internal features of the system. Trust can 
also vary according to Zeitgeist or “fashions”, i.e., in certain periods it is taken for granted 
that government can or cannot be trusted (Czarniawska and Sevon 1996). 
The popular mandate given by the people to government institutions and actors can, 
according to representation theory, be seen either as specific and binding, leading to 
strong mechanisms of public control of representatives, or else as rather general, 
furthering an independent role for representatives and institutions (Pitkin 1967). It is the 
latter type that currently seems to dominate. It makes great demands on politicians and 
bureaucrats, who are faced with the challenge of combining representativeness, 
responsiveness and sensitivity to popular demands and sentiments with efforts to 
influence and “educate” people (March and Olsen 1989 and 1995). Moreover, as the 
world becomes ever more complex, giving rise to increasingly complex institutional 
structures, constellations of actors, decision-making processes and policies, it becomes 
more difficult to define what the popular mandate, and hence the role of 
representatives, really consists of (Olsen 1984). 
People’s trust in government may be based on a number of common elements but 
also on divergent factors. There are potentially a large number of factors explaining 
variations in trust. One set of explanations is connected with people’s practical 
experience of specific administrative units, as shown in the literature on service 
satisfaction and trust (Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2001). When the individual’s 
experiences are largely good, they tend to trust the state (Kumlin 2002, Rothstein and 
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Steinmo 2002). Another is based on demographic factors, either individual or relational, 
such as education, gender and age (Christensen and Lægreid 2002a). A third set is 
political variables, such as level and type of political activity and political attitudes. This 
paper focuses on the latter set of variables, which are here labelled political-cultural 
variables. 
The main research questions raised are first: How much do people trust government 
and to what degree will trust of a general character, meaning high levels of trust in one 
institution correlate with high levels of trust in another institution?  Second, to what 
extent and in what ways do political-cultural variables affect trust in government? Can 
variations in trust be explained by broad attitudes to democracy and ideology? Do 
people who hold traditional attitudes towards the organization and functioning of the 
public sector and state apparatus have a higher level of trust than those with more 
modern attitudes towards current reforms of the public sector inspired by New Public 
Management (NPM) (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000)? 
The data used in this analysis are taken from a broad mass survey, covering 2,297 
respondents, conducted under the auspices of the Norwegian Power and Democracy 
Study in 2001. Norway has traditionally been characterized as a reluctant reformer, 
adapting slowly to the NPM reform movement and having an incremental and 
pragmatic reform style (Olsen 1996). It has taken a maintenance approach to 
modernization of the public sector, focusing more on management and improving the 
efficiency of the public sector than on rolling back the state. The Norwegian version of 
NPM was characterized by the pragmatic introduction of a formalized performance-
assessment regime, labeled “Management by Objectives and Results” (MBOR) and 
sector-specific reforms involving greater autonomy, agencification and devolution for 
public enterprises (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a). Until the mid-1990s the 
privatization drive, contracting-out and out-sourcing were relatively weak. The pace of 
reform in Norway has, however, picked up over the last five years, and the label 
“reluctant reformer” is now less appropriate. Thus Norway is a latecomer to the NPM 
movement, speeding up the process after it seems to have peaked elsewhere 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2003b).  
The Norwegian public sector is one of the largest in the world; about 31 percent of 
the workforces are public employees. Norway has a strong statist democratic tradition, 
scores high on per capita income and abundance of natural resources, has relatively 
strong collectivistic and egalitarian values, is consensus-oriented and has a low level of 
internal conflict (Christensen 2003). It also has one of the most comprehensive and 
universal welfare states in the world. The regime’s performance, support for democracy 
and the level of trust in public institutions are generally higher than in most other 
countries (Dalton 1999, Klingemann 1999, McAllister 1999, Norris 1999b). Surveys of 
political support for national government and parliament nearly always accord Norway a 
leading position (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995, Listhaug 1995 and 1998). Nevertheless, the 
pattern of confidence in political institutions is cyclical, and the level was lower at the 
end of the 1990s than in the early 1980s (Listhaug 2000).  
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Theoret ical  e laborat ions 
A n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l - c u l t u r a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  
The set of variables used in this paper for explaining variations in trust are primarily 
political, covering people’s attitudes towards the political and administrative system. The 
theoretical perspective that we use to elaborate on these variables is an institutional-
cultural one (March and Olsen 1989, Selznick 1957). The main theoretical arguments of 
such a perspective proceed from the notion that a political system, encompassing 
political and administrative institutions and actors, but also people as citizens, cannot be 
designed but develops in a natural way, more through processes of institutionalization 
and integration than of aggregation. Over time institutional features evolve, as identities 
and informal norms and values are added to the more formal organizational features. 
Furthered by a mechanism of path-dependency, the system develops certain political 
and administrative traditions that make it distinctive or even unique (Krasner 1988). 
This uniqueness reflects an adaptation to internal and external factors and pressure that 
will vary from one political-administrative system to another and also display national 
variations. 
The uniqueness of the institutional features of each individual political system means 
that each country will have traditions of system-wide norms and values. The historical 
trajectories of political-administrative systems, leading to certain norms of 
appropriateness, may have passed through quite complex and diverse processes of 
development. Certain systems will be characterized by strongly hierarchical and closed 
processes of institutionalization, others will have negotiations among competing 
interests, while others still will have a large degree of variety, inconsistency and 
“temporal orders” (Christensen and Røvik 1999). Some systems will see it as 
appropriate to follow logic of consequences or self-interest in public policy, while others 
will see this as highly inappropriate (March 1994). Norway, for example, represents a 
collectivistic, high-context culture with a long statist-oriented tradition, emphasizing 
equality and homogeneity. In contrast the United States is more accurately categorized 
as an individualistic, low-context culture that caters much more to the values of 
individualism, competition, diversity and scepticism towards the central state 
(Christensen and Peters 1999, Christensen, Lægreid and Wise 2001). 
The important point is that each system will contain common norms of 
appropriateness (March 1994). The members of the system will learn how to cope with 
the matching of identities, institutional rules and situations and internalize this 
knowledge. They will learn how to behave appropriately and react intuitively as good 
politicians, bureaucrats or citizens (March and Olsen 1989). But the norms of 
appropriateness and how strong they are will vary among systems. There will also be 
norms indicating how to cope with subcultures, and these will naturally be stronger 
under conditions of social and geographical heterogeneity. 
The institutional-cultural perspective sees the development of political-administrative 
systems primarily as evolutionary. This means that systems develop gradually and 
incrementally, primarily elaborating their central norms and values in a careful way. 
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Institutional leaders will, in such a perspective, mainly be guardians of path-dependency 
and “historical necessities”, trying to proceed slowly further down the road already 
taken. Their motive in adhering to the tried-and-tested path is that alternative paths 
would imply a retraining and refocusing of the institution that might demand a lot of 
extra resources and create insecurity and ambiguity (Krasner 1988). Such institutional 
systems are, however, constantly threatened by change or reform, whether internal or 
external, and hence, as Selznick (1957) underlines, leaders also must be able to make 
“critical decisions”, not only routine ones. They must balance the need for stability and 
continuity with the need for change; otherwise the system will become too rigid, 
potentially putting its “survival” in jeopardy. 
When a political-administrative system with strong institutional features encounters 
demands for change, for example through modern reforms, the crucial question is how 
compatible the norms and values underlying the proposed reforms are with the 
traditions of the system (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). A high level of compatibility makes 
it quite easy to accept change, since it can be adapted to existing institutional features. A 
low level of compatibility, on the other hand, often leads to resistance and conflicts 
about the very essence or “soul” of the system. Another possibility is that change will be 
accepted but not implemented, working primarily in the form of ideas, myths and 
symbols (Brunsson 1989, Christensen and Lægreid 2003c). In such a situation 
institutional leaders with the ability to take “critical decisions” will often pragmatically 
accept some of the changes demanded, but adapt, translate and edit them to fit existing 
institutional norms and values (Røvik 1996, 1998, Sahlin-Andersson  1996, Czarniawska 
and Sevon 1996). 
The most dramatic scenarios for political-administrative systems are periods of 
extreme crisis and turbulence. At such times one often witnesses the breaking off of a 
historical trajectory and the beginning of a new one. This can happen when leaders, 
often in an entrepreneurial spirit, seize a “window of opportunity” to make dramatic 
changes, seeing the system as unable to live with “performance crises” (March and 
Olsen 1989) and “punctuated equilibria” (Krasner 1988) at “critical junctions” (Collier 
and Collier 1991, Kingdon 1984). A typical example of this phenomenon was New 
Zealand in the early 1980s, when, in the face of a severe economic crisis, Roger Douglas 
seized the opportunity to lead the country down an extreme NPM path that was largely 
incompatible with the country’s past (Aberbach and Christensen 2001). States of crisis 
have not, however, been typical for Norway over the last 20 years. 
T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  p o l i t i c a l  
a t t i t u d e s  
Given the institutional-cultural perspective outlined and the institutional features of the 
political-administrative system – how might people’s political attitudes develop? A point 
of departure is to focus on the development of individual identities. Individual identities 
can be formed in the course of two interwoven processes: a process of individualization 
and a process of socialization (March 1994:61–66). In the former process the individual 
chooses to adopt a number of self-imposed and self-selected roles. People can, for 
example, choose to join an interest group or a political party or to apply for a certain 
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type of education or job on the basis of demographic characteristics or path-
dependencies in their own personal development.  
In the process of socialization, however, obligations, responsibilities and 
commitments are learned and followed, not chosen. Individual identity and the 
development of attitudes are assumed much more to reflect institutional identity, 
traditions, norms and values. The institutions where the individual has his or her 
primary connections – for example the place of work – are held to have the most 
determining influence on how individual identities develop. This is what Krasner (1988) 
calls vertical depth of institutional processes, i.e. “the deep structures” of identity develop 
via roles that are important for the individual. 
The logic of appropriateness presupposes that individuals have multiple identities, 
and therefore also multiple rule options, which become relevant in the different 
situations an individual may face (March 1994: 63, 68). An implicit assumption is that 
these identities and rules exist in relatively consistent sets, furthering systematic attitudes 
and behaviour. But competing logics of appropriateness, reflecting competing identities 
and rules, complex dependencies and attention structures would also seem inevitable 
(Christensen and Røvik 1999:164–165). This could potentially lead to more variation, 
tension and ambiguity in the development of attitudes. 
We will look primarily at the end result of the development of individual political 
attitudes rather than probing the question of why people have developed the attitudes 
they have. We will not, for example, address the question of how political attitudes 
correlate with demographic variables, such as gender, education or employment. 
The political attitude variables examined in the analysis are divided into three groups, 
one consisting of broad political attitudes and the other two of more specific sets of 
political attitudes. The first group covers people’s attitudes towards the functioning of 
democracy and their ideological position. The second covers attitudes to the 
organization and functioning of the public sector and public apparatus. We have labelled 
these “attitudes to tradition”, reflecting the traditional Norwegian institutional political 
and administrative context, embracing a large public sector and emphasizing political 
control, universalism, people’s rights and egalitarian values (Christensen 2003). The 
third group concerns people’s attitudes towards public-sector reform, which we label 
“attitudes to modernism”. People described as “modernist” tend to espouse NPM-
oriented reforms that favour efficiency, market solutions, competition and privatization. 
These are all values that traditionally have been fairly incompatible with the Norwegian 
statist tradition but that have started to make more of an impact during the last five 
years, furthered mainly by central-right governments (Christensen and Lægreid 2003b) 
I n d i v i d u a l  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  a n d  t r u s t :   
s o m e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
Our starting point concerning the concept of trust is the distinction made by Easton 
(1965) between diffuse and specific support for a political system. Diffuse support 
emphasizes system-wide and general support for the political system, often built on a 
long “tenure” as a citizen, while specific support can be described as people’s support 
for specific institutions, actors and policies, regardless of systemic givens, and is 
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generally expected to be more “recent” in origin. Levels of diffuse support, which seems 
to form a central dimension of trust, consist of several interwoven elements (Bouckaert 
and Van de Walle 2001). First, people may have underlying ideological reasons for 
supporting or trusting the government, for instance, because they support collective 
societal goals and favour a large public sector (March and Olsen 1989). Second, general 
support and trust may be a consequence of structural legitimacy, i.e. people have a long-
term positive experience of the way government is structured and works. This may 
cover satisfaction with the formal organization of government (the way government 
tasks are specialized and coordinated), the fairness of rules and the enactment of central 
roles, including the overall perceived level of professional competence and satisfaction 
with central political and administrative leaders. A third general set of factors that may 
be of significance for diffuse support and trust is macro-factors, like economic 
performance and levels of unemployment (Miller and Listhaug 1999). 
People’s more specific support for or trust in the political system seems to divide 
into two main categories – support for process and support for output (Easton 1965). 
People may trust the government because they have recent positive experience of 
decision-making processes or public services. Conversely, distrust might emerge from 
disagreement with the government’s handling of specific policy issues, like immigration 
policy (Aardal 1999). This may relate to how the policy-making process is structured – 
i.e. in terms of actors, problems, solutions and rules, participation of affected parties and 
openness – but also to the level of professional competence experienced. Specific trust 
and support that is process-based may be rather unaffected by an unfavourable output, 
because the process as such is seen as appropriate. Output-related specific trust and 
support, very typical for NPM-related reforms, stems more from whether a public 
decision or service is seen to be fulfilling the interests of individuals or specific groups 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2002b). Whereas process is about “doing things the right 
way” output is about “doing the right things”. The process of decision-making is not 
important as long as the results are favourable. Traditionally process and procedures are 
more prominent features of democracy than output and results. 
The three sets of political attitudes we use in the analysis relate in different ways to 
general and specific trust and support. The broad set of political attitudes relates 
primarily to diffuse support and general trust. The first variable – “satisfaction with 
democracy” – obviously covers a whole range of experiences with institutions and 
actors over a longer period of time (Christensen and Lægreid 2002a). We have every 
reason to expect that people scoring high on satisfaction with democracy would trust 
government both broadly and more specifically. The second variable – “position on a 
Left-Right dimension” – covers the ideologically based trust dimension and people’s 
attitudes towards a variety of more specific policies over time. The main expectation is 
that Norwegian citizens who place themselves towards the Left of the political spectrum 
will trust the government the most, because they traditionally support collective values 
and a large public sector. In Norway a person’s position on the Left-Right ideological 
dimension has proven to be a consistent and important factor in understanding attitudes 
towards public-sector institutions (Aardal and Valen 1989). A qualifying expectation is 
that differences in levels of trust between people positioned at the two extremes of the 
Left-Right dimension would not be that large, since Norway has a long tradition of a 
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strong state and of a welfare state that has been built up with few conflicts; political 
cleavages among the population are therefore neither very numerous nor very profound 
(Christensen 2003). 
The second set of political attitudes, encompassing “attitudes to tradition” 
(Christensen and Lægreid 1998) would seem to relate to the more general aspects of 
trust, focusing on questions about political and administrative norms and values that 
have traditionally been strong in Norway, such as universalism in service provision, the 
strengthening of public services and political control of state-owned companies (Grønlie  
2001). The expectation is that people supporting these values will score highest on trust, 
particularly towards the main political institutions and the public administration. 
The third set of political attitudes measured are the “attitudes to modernism”, which 
are assumed to relate more to specific aspects of trust. These variables are designed to 
reveal whether people have political attitudes that are supportive of norms and values 
connected to efficiency, marketization and privatization in the public sector – features 
that are central to the NPM reform wave (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000, Self 2000). They 
can be seen either as reform ideas and ideological symbols or as reflecting real changes 
going on in the Norwegian system. The main expectation is that people espousing 
“modernist” political attitudes will score low on trust. The Norwegian system is still 
rather traditional concerning the organization of the public sector, even though more 
radical changes are occurring currently; hence “modernist” values may primarily be seen 
as an alternative to the traditional integrative Norwegian state model. 
Data and method  
The data set used in this paper were obtained from a mail survey sent to a representative 
sample of Norwegian citizens between the ages of 18 and 84. 5,000 persons received the 
questionnaire and the response rate was 46 percent. The respondents are representative 
for the population between the ages of 18 and 75 in terms of gender and age, but there 
is some overrepresentation of people with higher education (NSD 2002). 
The dependent variable – trust in government – is based on a direct question about 
trust in various political and administrative actors and institutions.2 For each of these 
categories the respondents were asked to evaluate their level of trust on a scale from 0 
(no trust at all) to 10 (a very high level of trust). We look at trust in six different actors 
and institutions: the parliament (the Storting), the cabinet, the public administration (in 
general), local councils (municipal level), political parties (in general) and politicians (in 
general). We also used a general trust variable, constructed as an additive index based on 
the six single variables. 
The first group of independent variables consists of two political-cultural variables. 
One focus on how satisfied people are with the functioning of democracy in Norway, 
                                                 
2 The question was: “Below are the names of various institutions, such as the police, the cabinet, the civil service etc. 
How much trust do you have in each of these institutions?” In addition to the six institutions examined in this 
paper, the list also included the police, the courts, the EU and the UN. 
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on a scale from 1 to 4 (very satisfied).3 The other covers the Left-Right dimension in 
politics, asking the respondents to place themselves on this dimension, ranging from 0 
(far Left) to 10 (far Right).4  
The second group of independent variables represents attitudes to tradition. The 
respondents were asked to what degree they agreed with the following statements on a 
scale from 1 (agree completely) to 5 (disagree completely). The first statement was on 
universalistic attitudes: “Less attention should be paid to people’s right to free public 
services and more attention to the users’ obligation to pay for the services themselves”; 
the second on strengthening the public sector: “It is more important to expand public 
services than to have lower taxes”; and the third on political control: “The political 
control of a number of public companies like Telenor, Norwegian Railways and 
Norwegian Post is too weak and should be strengthened”.  
The third group of independent variables covers attitudes to modernism. People 
were asked to respond to four statements in the same way as for the attitudes to 
tradition. The first statement was about the significance of efficiency problems: “It is 
not lack of resources but lack of efficient use of resources that is the most important 
problem in the public sector”; the second was on the relative importance of efficiency: 
“One should pay more attention to efficiency in the public sector than to equal 
treatment”; the third focused on privatization: “In Norway one should encourage 
privatization and a smaller public sector”; and the fourth on market solutions: ”Supply 
and demand on the market should direct economic development to a greater extent 
than it does now ”.  
Empir ical  results  
T h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e :  t r u s t  i n  
g o v e r n m e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
First, we give an overall view of trust in government, using the dependent variable. One 
question is whether people’s trust in government is of a general character or 
differentiated among various political and administrative actors and institutions. Table 1 
shows that respondents do not tend to differentiate their trust very much, even though 
there are some differences between political and administrative institutions, the core 
governmental institutions, and political parties and politicians. Trust is highest in 
parliament and in the public administration and lowest in political parties and politicians. 
                                                 
3 Here we use the standard question used in the Eurobarometer and the World Value Survey: “Are you generally very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy functions in Norway”? (Norris 1999a). 
4 The question was: ”In politics one often talks about the ”Left ” and the “Right”. Where would you generally place 
yourself on this scale”? 
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Table 1. Trust in government on a scale from 0 to 10. Average score. N=2252. 
Parliament Cabinet Public 
administration 
Local 
council  
Political 
parties  
Politicians Overall trust 
index 
5.21 4.93 5.02 4.94 4.11 3.80 4.61 
 
This supports a more general finding in several studies that trust in general institutions is 
normally higher than in specific actors, such as politicians (Norris 1999a). A decline in 
party identification and party membership in Norway in recent years reflects a more 
general trend, i.e. political parties have, to a greater or lesser degree, declined as socially 
integrated movements (Listhaug 2000, Strøm and Svåsand 1997). In addition, media 
targeting of and pressure on individual politicians has increased, leading to more 
criticism and greater legitimacy problems, which in turn gives politicians less political 
leeway and creates more problems of attention and capacity (Christensen and Lægreid 
2002c). 
Our main finding seems to be rather paradoxical. How is it that people trust certain 
central political institutions more than the central actors in them? One reason for this 
could be that the political and administrative institutions have built up their trust over a 
long period of time, are path-dependent and less vulnerable to social change processes, 
and people may also differentiate between formal structures and actors who come and 
go (Selznick 1957). Political parties and politicians may be seen as representing special 
interests that mess up the system, and they may encounter greater problems in dealing 
with modernization and change processes. The modern mass media have probably 
enhanced this trend, because it is easier to criticize individual parties and politicians than 
to focus on or gain insight into the workings of the cabinet, of the parliament as a whole 
or of the civil service in general. 
The second question is whether trust in government indicates some kind of 
cumulative pattern, as many studies have shown (Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2001:12), 
or whether there are certain clusters of trust. Table 2 shows quite clearly a cumulative 
pattern concerning trust, i.e. if people trust one of the governmental or political 
institutions or actors they normally trust the others as well; or if they distrust one they 
also distrust the others. Thus, there is a cluster of trust relationships that encompasses 
the main political institutions and actors (Listhaug 1998). There does not seem to be a 
clear distinction between regime institutions and political actors, as claimed by Norris 
(1999a). Government seems to be approached as a rather amorphous concept, and 
citizens have difficulty distinguishing one institution or set of actors from another 
(Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2001, Dinsdale and Marson 1999). 
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Table 2. Correlation between different measures of trust in government. Pearson’s R. 
 Parliament Cabinet Public 
administration 
Local council Political 
parties  
Cabinet .80     
Public administration .66 .64    
Local council .59 .61 .55   
Political parties .72 .68 .56 .59  
Politicians .69 .67 .61 .58 .79 
All scores are significant on  .000 level 
There are, however, some small variations in this picture. Trust in parliament and 
cabinet have the highest inter-correlative score together with trust in political parties and 
politicians, and these four trust measures also inter-correlate strongly. We find the 
lowest correlative scores between trust in local councils and other trust factors, 
indicating that attitudes to the lowest level of the system are somewhat different, 
although scores are still on a highly significant level.  
T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s :  t h r e e  s e t s  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  
In the set of broad political and ideological variables, the first variable on democracy shows 
quite clearly that people are satisfied, but not strongly so. Four percent are very satisfied 
with the working of democracy in Norway, 70 percent relatively satisfied, 23 percent 
relatively dissatisfied and 4 percent very dissatisfied. Compared to 1995 there has been a 
slow decrease in satisfaction with democracy, but the level is still high compared to 
other countries (Aardal 1999) The second variable – position on a Left-Right political-
ideological dimension – shows that the largest group (26 percent) put themselves in the 
middle category (5). This is in line with the Norwegian party structure. The largest party 
has traditionally been a moderate labour party and the differences between parties are 
relatively small. Few take extreme positions. Only 4 percent put themselves in the two 
categories on the far Left (0 and 1) and 7 percent adopted positions to the Right (9 and 
10). The mean is 5.32, showing a slight leaning to the Right among the respondents. 
The second set of political variables consists of three measures of attitudes to tradition. 
Table 3 shows the scores for each of the variables. 
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Table 3. Variables showing attitudes towards traditional government. Percentage. 
 Completely 
agree 
Partly 
agree 
Both 
agree 
and 
dis-
agree 
Partly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
Mean N= Mis -
sing 
Undermine 
universalism 
 
5 
 
18 
 
17 
 
27 
 
34 
 
3.68 
 
2131 
 
(166) 
Strengthen public 
sector 
 
19 
 
34 
 
13 
 
20 
 
14 
 
2.75 
 
2169 
 
(128) 
Increase political  
control of public 
companies 
 
 
24 
 
 
28 
 
 
21 
 
 
14 
 
 
13 
 
 
2.65 
 
 
2037 
 
 
(260) 
 
The table shows quite a consistent picture, indicating that traditionalist values are 
relatively strong. The first variable shows that support for universalism is rather strong 
among the respondents. Sixty-one percent disagree partly or completely with the 
statement that the government ought to pay less attention to people having free access 
to public services and more to users having to pay for the services, while 23 percent 
agree. Traditionally universalism has been a central feature of the Norwegian welfare 
state, but over the last decade it has been more debated and some services have 
introduced user fees. Nevertheless, the main services, like health and school education, 
are still free in principle. Despite some attacks on the universalism of the welfare state in 
Norway, it is characterized by institutional stability (Eitrheim and Kuhnle 2000). 
However, the strong support for universalism in the population decreased from 32 
percent in 1990 to 30 percent in 1996, declining to 23 percent in 2001 (Lægreid 1997). 
 The second variable is the question whether it is more important to strengthen 
and extend public services than to decrease taxes. The table shows clearly that more 
people agree than disagree with this (53 percent versus 34 percent), revealing a deep-
seated cultural adaptation to a high tax level in order to support a large public sector.  
The third variable concerns the issue of whether political control of state-owned 
companies that have gained more autonomy under NPM is too weak and should be 
strengthened. The background to this question is that, like many other countries, 
Norway has reorganized its state-owned companies, moving them both formally and 
actually further away from executive political leaders and ministries and making them 
more commercially oriented (Christensen and Lægreid 2003b). People are obviously 
sceptical towards this development, showing attention to traditional norms and values: 
52 percent of the respondents support more control, while 27 percent do not. This is 
quite different from the attitudes of elites in Norway, where the majority do not support 
such a strengthening of control (Christensen and Lægreid 2003a). The leaders of state-
owned companies are, as expected, very much against an increase in control, but so, too, 
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are top civil servants; executive political leaders and parliamentarians are more divided 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2002c). 
Table 4 reports on a third set of political attitudes, the modernist variables, which are 
connected with the efficiency and privatisation variables. Overall the picture seems to be 
rather varied. The first variable relates to efficiency problems. Here an overwhelming 
majority of the respondents hold the general opinion that it is not scarcity of resources 
that is the problem in the public sector, but the way these resources are utilized. Here 
“resources” refers chiefly to Norway’s petroleum revenues, and the responses also 
reflect the fact that efficiency problems are high on the agenda of critics of the public 
bureaucracy in Norway. In spite of the strong focus on efficiency problems in the 
government’s modernization programs over the past 15 years, public criticism has 
continued unabated. In 2001, 84 percent of citizens agreed with the efficiency problem 
statement compared with 74 percent in 1996 and 80 percent in 1990 (Lægreid 1997). 
The second variable shows that although efficiency may be a problem, greater 
efficiency is not favoured at the expense of equal treatment. Fifty-six percent of the 
respondents disagree that efficiency is most important, compared with 27 percent who 
agree. These attitudes confirm the relatively strong egalitarian values in Norwegian 
society. Popular opinion on this issue has not changed very much over the past 12 years. 
In 1990, 26 percent agreed with the statement and in 1996, 22 percent (Lægreid 1997).  
Table 4. Variables showing attitudes towards modernism in government. Percentage. 
 Completely 
agree 
Partly 
agree 
Both 
agreea
nd dis-
agree 
Partly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
Mean N= Missing 
Efficiency 
problems 
43 41 8 6 2 1.83 2152 (145) 
Importance of 
efficiency 
 
9 
 
18 
 
16 
 
25 
 
31 
 
3.50 
 
2120 
 
(177) 
More 
privatization 
 
15 
 
34 
 
15 
 
21 
 
16 
 
2.90 
 
2142 
 
(155) 
More markets 7 30 26 21 16 3.09 2052 (245) 
 
The third variable focuses on whether Norway should privatize more and have a smaller 
public sector. The respondents are much more divided on this question, with a majority 
favouring more privatization (49 percent agree, 37 percent disagree). To understand 
these responses one has to remember that the privatization debate in Norway is taking 
place in the context of a large public sector and in a country where privatization has 
traditionally been an ideologically-charged issue. In general the Norwegian elite is much 
more in favour of more privatization than Norwegian citizens (Christensen and Lægreid 
2003a). 
The fourth variable deals with whether market forces should be more important than 
the government in influencing economic development. Here the respondents are 
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divided equally in their attitudes. Until the early 1980s Norwegian economic policy was 
strongly influenced by the Keynesian approach to economic planning; since then, 
however, it has been more deregulated and more open to the market. 
Table 5 shows quite a varied picture concerning the correlations among the 
independent variables. If we first look at the correlations inside each of the three 
clusters of variables, the two variables measuring broad political attitudes show a low 
but significant positive correlation. This means that people on the Left of the political 
spectrum are slightly more satisfied with democracy than people on the Right.  
Among the traditionalist variables the correlations show, as expected, that people 
who support strongly universalism would also like to strengthen the public sector, as 
would people who favour increased control of public companies. 
Table 5. Correlations between different measures of political attitudes. Pearson’s R. 
 Satisfaction 
with 
democracy 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2.Left-Right dimension  
.09* 
 
 
      
3.Undermine 
universalism 
 
-.03 
 
-.24* 
      
4.Strengthen public 
sector 
 
.16* 
 
.35* 
 
-.18* 
     
5.Increase political 
control of public 
companies 
 
 
-.04 
 
 
.21* 
 
 
.00 
 
 
.19* 
    
6. Efficiency problems -.09* -.21* .11* -.16* -.03    
7.Importance of 
efficiency 
 
-.03 
 
-.16 
 
.38* 
 
-.12* 
 
.10* 
 
.19* 
  
8. More privatization -.07 -.52* .35* -.35* -.25* .31* .25*  
9.More markets .00 -.38* .25* -.14* -.16* .18* .21* .41* 
*Scores are significant on .000-level. 
The modernist variables show overall strong inter-correlations, the strongest ones are 
those between support for privatization and support for markets, and between support 
for privatization and emphasis on efficiency problems. The general picture is that if 
people prefer privatization they also prefer market solutions, see big efficiency problems 
in the public sector and are less concerned with issues of resource-accessibility and 
equality.  
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If we now focus on correlations between the clusters of variables, position on the 
Left-Right dimension shows an overall stronger correlation with the other two clusters 
than satisfaction with democracy. The correlations are, as expected, particularly strong 
with core variables about privatization and markets, and with those concerning 
undermining universalism and strengthening the public sector. The respondents are 
obviously clearly divided between those at the Left end of the political spectrum, who 
support universalism and a strong public sector and are sceptical towards privatization 
and market solutions, and those tending towards the Right, who support the opposite 
values and norms.  
If we look at the correlations between the traditionalist and modernist variables, the 
strongest correlation is that people who support universalism in the welfare state see 
little need for increased privatization or strengthening the market and do not emphasize 
efficiency at the expense of equal treatment; resistance towards privatization is also 
combined with support for strengthening the public sector and increasing political 
control of public companies. This illustrates that modernist and traditionalist attitudes in 
many ways represent two sides of the coin. If one favours traditionalist values one 
scores low on modernist attitudes and vice-versa.  
A n a l y s i s  a n d  d i s c u s s i o n :  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e  
v a r i a b l e s  a n d  t r u s t  
The next question on which we focus is how the score for each independent variable 
correlates with trust variables. We first examine the bivariate relations between each set 
of variables and trust in various government institutions and then do a multivariate 
analysis of the relative importance of the various independent variables for the trust in 
government index and for trust in public administration. 
 
Bivariate analysis. Table 6 shows the bivariate correlations between our independent 
variables covering political attitudes and trust in various political and administrative 
institutions and actors. The main finding is that there is a lot of consistency. The 
correlations between the political attitude variables and each of the dependent variables 
do not vary much, i.e. there is an overall pattern, indicating that the trust index could be 
used for a regression analysis. Five of the nine independent variables show significant 
and consistent correlations with all the dependent variables. The only variable with no 
significant correlation with trust is attitudes towards universalism. This might be 
explained by the decreasing support for these attitudes among the population and by the 
fact tha t conflicting attitudes among different groups contradict and neutralize each 
other. 
If we look at the varying strength of the correlations, the most important 
independent variable is satisfaction with democracy. People who are most satisfied with 
how democracy works in Norway today also have by far the most trust in government.  
Satisfaction with democracy is more important for trust than position on the Left-
Right dimension, although people on the Left of the political spectrum consistently trust 
government more than those on the Right. This indicates that opinion of general regime 
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performance is relatively more important than political ideology, something that may 
reflect the absence of deep political cleavages in Norway. The independent variables 
vary somewhat in the different trust scores. Satisfaction with democracy correlates 
strongest with trust in parliament and the cabinet, which form the backbone of 
Norway’s relatively centralized democracy. For position on the Left-Right spectrum, the 
correlation with trust in the cabinet is strongest, something that may reflect either more 
long-term trust in the cabinet as an institution or possibly more short-term trust in the 
current cabinet, which was a Labour minority government during the survey conducted 
in 2001. 
Table 6. Correlations between political variables and trust in government. Pearson’s R. 
 Parlia-
ment  
Cabinet Public 
admini-
stration 
Local 
council  
Political 
parties  
Poli-
ticians  
Trust 
index 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 
 
-.42*** 
 
-.44*** 
 
-.37*** 
 
-.29*** 
 
-.33*** 
 
-.36*** 
 
-.44*** 
Left-Right dimension  
-.10*** 
 
-.18*** 
 
-.14*** 
 
-.06** 
 
-.06** 
 
-.10*** 
 
-.13*** 
Undermine 
universalism 
 
.04 
 
.03 
 
.04 
 
-.01 
 
.01 
 
.00 
 
.03 
Strengthen public 
sector 
 
-.19*** 
 
-.19*** 
 
-.23*** 
 
-.16*** 
 
-.15*** 
 
-.18*** 
 
-.21*** 
Increase political 
control of 
public companies 
 
 
.07** 
 
 
.06** 
 
 
.01 
 
 
.00 
 
 
.04 
 
 
.03 
 
 
.05* 
Efficiency 
problems 
 
.15*** 
 
.17*** 
 
.23*** 
 
.10*** 
 
.14*** 
 
.17*** 
 
.19*** 
Importance of 
efficiency 
 
.10*** 
 
.06** 
 
.10*** 
 
.02 
 
.05 
 
.03 
 
.08*** 
More privatization .11*** .14*** .17*** .08*** .07*** .11*** .13*** 
More markets .06*** .05 .05 .02 .05 .05 .06** 
***significant on .000-level.;** significant on .01-level; *: significant on .05-level 
With regard to satisfaction with democracy, the variable showing the strongest 
correlation with trust, one can ask whether it is possible to distinguish the variables 
theoretically and empirically. Kaase (1999) stresses that these are indicators of the same 
phenomenon, while Miller and Listhaug (1999) take satisfaction with democracy as an 
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indicator of the extent to which citizens support political institutions or democratic 
principles. While these concepts are obviously close, it is also possible to differentiate 
between them. Norris (1999a) and Klingemann (1999) regard satisfaction with 
democracy as an indicator of citizens’ evaluation of regime performance, which may or 
may not be interpreted as satisfaction with the incumbent government. Another 
difference is that trust may imply more commitment and potential willingness to let 
institutions and actors act on one’s behalf or to have autonomy in doing so. Satisfaction 
is a narrower term, even if it concerns democracy, and it is not obvious that satisfaction 
always leads to trust. A third argument is that satisfaction with democracy, as it is posed 
in this survey, relates more to the current working of democracy, while trust may be 
based on a broader and more long-term perspective. 
The second most important variable is the one relating to strengthening the public 
sector. People who favour a strengthening of public services, instead of lowering taxes, 
are more inclined to trust the government. A third variable worth mentioning is the one 
related to efficiency problems. People who rather strongly disagree that the government 
and the public sector do not lack resources but have an efficiency problem trust 
government the most. It is interesting that this correlation is strongest concerning trust 
in the public administration. And finally, people disagreeing with the demand for more 
privatization and a smaller public sector trust government the most. This is especially 
the case for trust in the public administration. 
 
Multivariate analysis. We now turn to the question of the relative explanatory power of 
the different independent variables for variations in trust in government by focusing on 
the additive trust index based on the six single variables.5 Because of our special interest 
in trust in public administration we add this single institution to our analysis.  
The multivariate analyses (Table 7) confirm the strong effect of satisfaction with 
democracy revealed in the bivariate analyses. After controlling for Left-Right ideological 
allegiance, traditional opinions and modernist attitudes towards government, people’s 
satisfaction with how democracy works in Norway emerges as the strongest predictor of 
variation in the respondents’ trust in government. This variable can be seen as an 
indicator of general regime performance as well as of support for political institutions or 
democratic principles. This finding is consistent both for the general trust index and for 
the specific analysis of trust in the public administration. This indicates that citizens’ 
general political-democratic beliefs have a strong effect on their trust in public-sector 
institutions. This finding remains consistent when one controls for democratic factors 
and people’s experience and satisfaction with specific public services (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2002a).  
A second finding is that traditional attitudes, represented by agreement with the 
statement that it is more important to expand public services than to lower taxes, have a 
significant effect on both trust in government generally and in public administration 
specifically. What is more, modernist values, represented by agreement with the notion 
                                                 
5 The reason for this is the strong inter-correlation between trust in the six institutions (Table 2) and the relatively 
strong similarities between trust in each institution and the various independent variables (Tables 6).  
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that it is not lack of resources but inefficient use of them that is the most important 
problem in the public sector, shows a significant negative variation concerning trust in 
government generally and even more so concerning trust in public administration.  
Table 7.  Summary of regression equation by individual political attitudes and trust. Standardized 
Beta Coefficients. Linear regression 
 Trust in government Trust in public 
administration 
General attitudes: 
Satisfaction with democracy 
Position on Left-Right dimension 
 
-.40*** 
-.02 
 
-.32*** 
.00 
Attitudes to tradition: 
Strengthening public sector 
 
-.12*** 
 
-.14*** 
Attitudes to modernism: 
Efficiency problems 
Importance of efficiency 
More privatization 
 
.12*** 
.01 
.02 
 
.17*** 
.02 
.04 
Multiple R 
R2 
Adjusted R 
F statistics 
Significance of F 
.483 
.233 
.231 
95,153 
.000 
.447 
.199 
.197 
77,194 
.000 
Bivariate correlations that are significant at .000-level are included in the regressions 
 
The analysis confirms our general hypothesis that broad positive political attitudes and 
orientations towards democracy and positive, traditionalist attitudes towards the public 
sector enhance trust in government institutions generally and public administration 
especially, while more negative, modernist attitudes towards the public sector tend to 
weaken trust in government.  
Conclusion  
In this paper we have shown, first, that people’s trust in government is of a general 
nature, with some differentiating features. Variations in trust between the different 
institutions are relatively small, but levels of trust are highest in the parliament and 
lowest in politicians, while there is a strong inter-correlation between trust in the 
different institutions. People with a high level of trust in one institution also tend to 
trust the other institutions, while distrust in one is related to distrust in others. In other 
WORKING  PAPER 7 – 2003 TRUST  IN  GOVERNMENT  
 24
words, trust in government shows a cumulative pattern, and trust relations are more 
supplementary than alternative.  
Second, trust in governmental institutions varies significantly with political-cultural 
factors, including broad political attitudes as well as traditionalist and modernist political 
attitudes. People who are satisfied with how democracy works and who support 
traditional features of the Norwegian public sector generally have more trust in 
government organizations than citizens who support ideas and values connected with 
NPM public-sector reform. One can ask whether this will eventually lead to less trust in 
government, since more NPM measures are being implemented under the current 
government, or whether people will in the long run adapt their attitudes to the new 
norms and specific reforms. 
Third, the general political-cultural variables have the strongest overall effect on 
variation in people’s trust in government. This indicates that integration, involvement 
and engagement in the political system and the political-administrative culture is more 
important for trust in governmental institutions than people’s traditionalist values or 
modernist attitudes. The strong effect of general satisfaction with democracy indicates 
that passive political integration and satisfaction may be as important for trust as more 
specific opinions about particular aspects of public-sector values, organization and 
performance.  
The main picture is that variation in people’s trust in government institutions can be 
traced to a somewhat larger degree to factors affecting diffuse support for the political 
system (such as satisfaction with democracy) than to factors affecting specific support 
for particular aspects of public-sector reform (such as market competition and  
privatization). Long-term general identities seem to be more important than 
contemporary administrative policy issues. In a high-context culture with strong 
collectivistic attitudes like Norway, an intuitive understanding of how democracy works 
seems to have a greater impact on trust in government than opinions about specific 
reform initiatives or administrative policies (Bennett 1990; Christensen, Lægreid and 
Wise 2001). Whether this is because modern reforms are seen as ideas and symbols 
rather than more threatening specific reforms is not possible to tell from our data. What 
is more, if people tend to see government as an amorphous entity and do not make a 
clear distinction between the different institutions, as indicated in tables 1 and 2, it 
becomes difficult to determine the effect of specific aspects of public-sector 
organization, functioning and reform on trust in specific government institutions 
(Bouckaert and van de Valle 2001).  
The argument is compounded by the complexity of causality. Our assumption is that 
satisfaction with government and opinions about public sector organization, functioning 
and reform affect the level of trust in government: But it could also be the other way 
around, with more trusting attitudes leading to greater satisfaction with how democracy 
works and producing traditionalist (or modernist) attitudes towards the public sector, a 
conundrum that cannot easily be solved using the survey data (Huseby 2000). Svallfors 
(2002) examinees how the absence or presence of political trust affects attitudes towards 
state intervention. He concludes that political trust does not matter a great deal for 
attitudes towards the welfare state. The truth is probably that we are looking at mutually 
dependent processes and a co-evolution between different sets of attitudes, opinions 
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and beliefs (March and Olsen 1989). This makes it difficult to operate with clear 
dependent and independent variables and reveals a greater need for an approach that 
allows the dynamics of opinion development to be studied.  
Bearing this in mind, we can say that regime performance and generally positive 
attitudes towards how democracy works within the national setting seem to further trust 
in government, but so do more specific political attitudes towards crucial questions of 
administrative policy and reforms. Citizens’ general level of  (political) identity and belief 
in politics and democracy enhances their trust in parliament, the cabinet, the civil 
service, local councils, political parties and politicians. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that trust is a multi-dimensional concept and 
there is no one-factor explanation for variations in people’s trust in governmental 
institutions. In addition, it is difficult to differentiate between different attitudes and 
beliefs that might affect trust. The variables are highly interwoven and interconnected. 
Furthermore, the reforms themselves can contribute to change in the normative 
foundation and in attitudes over time. Democracy is an open-ended project (Olsen 
1997) and the values and norms that constitute trust in democracy can change over 
time: for example through the development of meaning and interpretation of 
experiences with administrative reforms. Neo-liberal reforms based on the ideas of 
NPM might thus have a content that strengthens an aggregated and individualist 
conception of trust and democracy and weakens integrated and more collective values 
(Lægreid and Roness 1999).  
 One implication of this analysis is that the causal relations are contested, complex 
and multi-faceted. Citizens’ trust in government institutions seems to be a complex mix 
of images, ideology and stereotypes, as well as attitudes to specific aspects of public 
sector organization, functioning and reform. To gain a better understanding of the 
variation in citizens’ trust in government one needs to take a more comparative 
approach, focusing on changes over time and studying different institutions and 
different countries. 
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